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1. In troduction
The normal language user’s production and 
understanding of speech involves the highly 
skilled coordination of myriad processes. 
When a speaker conceives o f some commu­
nicative intention, he will select and order 
information whose expression may realize 
that intention. He will also formulate that 
information, i. e., give it linguistic shape. This 
includes retrieving the appropriate words 
from memory and assigning them their proper 
grammatical roles and syntactic positions. 
The speaker will further compute a phonetic 
specification for the developing utterance, 
and use it to guide the articulatory execution 
that produces overt speech. The addressee will 
normally try to reconstruct the speaker’s com­
municative intentions. She will perform an 
acoustic-phonetic analysis on the continuous 
speech signal in order to segment it into rec­
ognizable words and phrases. She will retrieve 
the syntactic properties and meanings of suc­
cessive words and parse the string into mean­
ingful phrases and sentences. And she will 
interpret this information in terms of the con­
text of interaction, the purpose of the ex­
change, the presuppositions about the speak­
er’s intentions, etc.
This complex system operates largely un­
awares. A speaker concentrates his attention 
on what is to be said, not on how it is to be 
done. The rate of fluent speech, some 2 to 3 
words per second, is too high for a speaker 
to ponder over each and every word or syn­
tactic construction. And there is no way for 
a speaker to consciously prepare some fifteen 
speech sounds per second. Similarly, the lis­
tener normally attends to the content of what 
is said, not to the phonetic shape of words or
the syntactic complexities o f the utterance. 
Like in all other skills, the lower level pro­
cesses are automatic, They don’t use central 
resources; they come for free.
In the following I will outline the architec­
ture of this skill. This involves the dissection  
of the speech processing system into com po­
nent subsystems. It also involves a character­
ization o f  the representations computed by 
the processing components as well as the 
manner in which these representations are 
computed. And it requires a specification of  
how the processing com ponents cooperate in 
producing their joint product. These matters 
will be discussed in reference to Figure 1.1. It 
is a ‘blueprint’ o f  the language user, depicting 
the main processing com ponents and their 
connections. We will proceed anticlockwise 
through the system, beginning at the highest 
conceptual level at which the speaker gener­
ates information to be expressed. We will 
follow the flow o f information down to artic­
ulation, the generation o f overt speech. We 
will then turn to the perception and parsing 
of speech, back to the conceptual interpreta­
tive level. After this grand tour some remarks 
will be made about the modes o f  cooperation  
between the various com ponents, in particu­
lar about incrementality and autonom y o f  
processing.
2. Speaking
2.1. Conceptual Preparation 
The conceptual preparation o f speech (see 
Figure 1.1, ‘conceptualize!-’) begins with the 
conception of an illocutionary intention, i. e., 
a communicative intention the speaker de­
cides to express by means o f  language. A  
communicative intention is one the speaker 
wants to be recognized as such by the ad­
dressee (Grice 1968). The speaker may want 
to refer to something, to express som e belief 
or expectation, to commit the addressee or 
himself to some course o f  action, etc. In order
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Fig. 1.1: Schematic representation o f  the processing components involved in spoken language use.
to make such intentions recognizable by the 
addressee, the speaker will decide on a speech, 
act and select information whose expression 
can realize that purpose. So, for instance, if  
the illocutionary intention is that the ad­
dressee w ill believe X, then one way is to state 
that X is the case. Or if the intention is that 
the addressee performs action Y, then the 
speaker m ay request that Y  be performed, 
Often the information expressed indicates the 
illocutionary intention indirectly. It is cold in
here may express the request to close the 
window (Clark 1979). Such indirect speech 
acts convey an intention that is not literally 
expressed (as in close the window). It is the 
rule rather than the exception that the infor­
mation selected for expression entertains an 
indirect relation to the intention to be con­
veyed. This is a powerful means to regulate 
personal relations in verbal interaction, to be 
polite, ironical, or whatever the situation 
might call for (Clark/Gerrig 1984), The in­
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formation expressed invites the addressee to 
in fer  the intention, and this may be based 
on conventions (as in the request interpreta­
tion of please) and on the mutual knowledge 
of the interlocutors in a discourse situation 
(Grice 1975; Clark/Chunk 1980). Meanings 
are not so much expressed as n e g o t ia te d  
between interlocutors. A simple intention to 
refer to a particular object may take several 
turns between interlocutors to become real­
ized (The newspaper — Which newspaper? — 
The one on the table — On the small table? — 
Yes, cf. Clark/Wilkes-Gibbs 1986).
Conveying an intention may involve the 
planning of a sequence of speech acts. If a 
speaker decides to comply with a request to 
describe his apartment in some detail, he will 
have to retrieve from memory a complex spa­
tial arrangement of spaces and objects. It will 
involve several statements o f fact to express 
this information. In such cases speakers have 
to solve the ‘linearization problem’, i. e., what 
to say first, what to express next, etc. When 
the complex information to be expressed is 
spatial, speakers solve the problem by making 
an imaginary tour — a body tour or a gaze 
tour — through the scene. When the infor­
mation is temporal, as in the description of 
events, speakers tend to adhere to the chron­
ological order (For an analysis o f  speakers’ 
linearization principles see Levelt 1989, 
138 ff). The speaker’s planning o f  a speech 
act, his selection of information to be ex­
pressed, and his linearization o f  that infor­
mation are called ‘macroplanning’ (Butter- 
worth 1980; Levelt 1989, 123 ff)-
In addition there is ‘microplanning’ to be 
done. First, the information to be expressed 
should be given ‘propositional shape’ and 
‘perspective’. An image of an apartment is 
not enough for an apartment description: 
something should be said about that image, 
for instance that the table is in front of the 
window. The speaker decides what predica­
tions have to be made about what referents, 
and this usually involves taking perspective. 
Is the spatial relation to be expressed as a 
property of the table (being in front o f the 
window) or as a property of the window 
(being behind the table)? Taking perspective 
is governed by various principles, among 
them Gestalt principles. Objects tend to be 
related to backgrounds, not inversely (i.e., 
the table being in front of the window, rather 
than the window being behind the table). 
Small objects are related to big objects, not
inversely (a pen on the table, not a table under 
the pen), etc.
Likewise, the expression o f  an event re­
quires a predication to be made, and that 
predication should have a certain perspective. 
One and the same event can be proposition- 
alized as the mother giving an ice cream to 
the child, or as the child receiving an ice cream  
from the mother. The proposition involves 
the same three arguments: mother, child, and 
ice cream, but in the first case the m other is 
the topic o f the event, in the second case the 
child is topic. These perspective relations have 
to be specified in the speaker’s conceptual 
preparation o f  speech, because they are im­
portant determinants o f  word choice (give, 
receive), and o f the assignment of grammat­
ical roles ( the mother as subject o f  the sentence 
or the child).
Microplanning also involves the assign­
ment of an ‘accessibility status’ to the refer­
ents in a proposition. I f  the mother in the 
above proposition had already been men­
tioned in the previous sentence, she is likely 
to be in the focus of the addressee’s attention. 
Knowing this, the speaker gives her a high 
accessibility status, which means that reduced 
or anaphoric reference can be made (She gave 
the ice cream to the child). There are various 
possible degrees o f accessibility, each leading 
to a different choice o f  referring expression  
(cf. Levelt 1989, 144 ff). Related to accessi­
bility is the assignment o f  ‘prominence’ to a 
referent. Something that may have particular 
‘news value’ for the addressee can be marked 
in the message, so it will eventually be pro- 
sodically stressed in the utterance. Finally, 
microplanning involves certain language-spe­
cific decisions. When a language (such as Eng­
lish) has a tense system, it is obligatory to 
specify the relevant temporal relations, even 
if they don’t contribute to conveying the 
speaker’s intention. A  speaker o f  a tenseless 
language (such as Chinese) will only plan for 
the expression o f  temporal relations where 
they are relevant for conveying his intentions. 
Languages may require conceptual prespeci­
fications o f  various sorts, such as the number 
(singular, plural) of referents, the degree of 
distance o f  objects to the speaker (proximal, 
medial, distal), the form or material o f ref­
erents (fork-shaped, clay), etc. Any o f  these 
quite arbitrary properties may be ‘gramma­
ticized’ in a language, i. e., have an effect on 
morphology or syntax.
The eventual output o f  a speaker’s concep­
tual preparation is technically called a ‘mes­
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sage’ (see Figure 1.1); in cases o f linearized 
information it is a series o f messages. It is the 
information to be expressed, in propositional 
format, and supplied with perspectives, ac­
cessibility statuses and language-specific con­
ceptual information. Such messages form the 
characteristic input to the Formulator (see 
Figure 1.1).
The Formulator maps messages onto lin­
guistic form. It performs two relatively inde­
pendent operations: grammatical encoding 
and phonological encoding.
2.2. Grammatical Encoding 
Grammatical encoding takes a message as 
input and delivers a surface structure as out­
put, A surface structure is a hierarchical or­
ganization of syntactic phrases. Its lowest- 
level elements are ‘lemmas’. These are lexical 
elements as yet unspecified for phonological 
form (That specification takes place during 
phonological encoding). The surface structure 
is a syntactic, not a conceptual representation. 
It represents syntactic relations or functions 
such as ‘head of phrase’, ‘subject o f ,  ‘direct 
object o f ,  etc. In so far, it is what Garrett 
(1975) called the ‘functional level represen­
tation’.
The generation o f surface structure is lex­
ically driven. Each lemma requires a partic­
ular syntactic environment, Grammatical en­
coding is like solving a set o f simultaneous 
equations: the surface structure m ust be such  
that for all lemmas the required syntactic 
environments are realized.
Lemmas can become available prior to syn­
tactic construction. How are they retrieved? 
Lemmas are entries in the ‘mental lexicon’ 
(see Figure 1.1), That is the repository o f  
knowledge about the words in one’s language. 
Most lemmas have a semantic specification. 
This is the set o f conceptual conditions under 
which the lemma can be appropriately used. 
So, for instance, the semantic specification  
for the lemma give is something like ‘an event 
in which agent X causes object Y to be trans­
ferred from agent X  to recipient Z’ (This can, 
of course, be given formal expression in som e 
logical language). So, if the speaker’s message 
is that the mother gives the child an ice cream, 
the conceptual condition for the appropriate 
use of the lemma give is fulfilled: There is an 
agent X (the mother), who causes the transfer 
of an object or theme Y  (the ice cream) to 
some recipient Z (the child). This being the 
case, the lemma give is retrieved from the 
lexicon. How does this take place? This is
controversial, or rather unknown. Theories 
o f  lexical selection do exist (i.e., Morton’s 
1969 Logogen theory and Miller and John- 
son-Laird’s 1976 decision table theory), but 
they are seriously inadequate and underspc- 
cifled (cf. Levelt 1989, 198 ff). Research on 
speech errors (cf. Garrett, this volume) and 
experimental studies (Levelt/Schriefers/Vor- 
berg et al. 1991) indicate that a single concept 
can (temporarily) trigger the activation of two 
or more semantically related lemmas (the 
lemma lexicon is clearly organized according 
to semantic principles). In most cases, how­
ever, a single lemma is selected and determines 
the further progress o f grammatical encoding. 
(For a further discussion of these issues, see 
the special issue of ‘Cognition’ on lexical ac­
cess in speech production, Levelt 1992.)
Each retrieved lemma contains two kinds 
o f  syntactic information; First, information 
specifying the lemma’s syntactic category 
(major category, such as Noun, Verb, Adjec­
tive, Preposition, or minor category, such as 
Auxiliary, Determiner). Second, information 
determining the lemma’s mapping of concep­
tual arguments (also called ‘thematic roles’) 
onto grammatical functions. The lemma give, 
for instance, specifies that the conceptual 
agent (X) should be assigned the grammatical 
role o f  subject in the surface structure, tlial 
the theme (Y) should be realized as a direct 
object, and the recipient (Z) as an oblique 
object. These mapping conditions are met in 
a sentence such as The mother gave an ice 
cream to the child. The lemma give also allows 
for another argument-to-function mapping, 
the so-called dative, which figures in a sen­
tence like The mother gave the child cm ice 
cream. M any transitive verbs also have a pas­
sive mapping, as in The child way given an ice 
cream b y  the mother. Which o f these map­
pings is chosen during grammatical encoding 
depends on what the speaker has chosen for 
the topic of discourse (mother or child in the 
example); the topic is preferably realized as 
the subject. It also depends on the order in 
which the various lemmas become available 
from the mental lexicon. The dative will be 
preferred if the recipient lemma (child in the 
example) is available before the theme lemma 
(iice cream). Hence, temporal ordering in 
grammatical encoding is multiply determined. 
Three forces compete in this ordering process: 
the syntactic ordering restrictions set by the 
grammar; the schedule of lemma retrieval 
which, in turn, depends on the timing anil 
saliency o f the concepts in the message (cf.
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Bock/Warren 1985); and the topicalization 
the speaker has decided to achieve.
Various mechanisms of grammatical en­
coding have been proposed, in particular 
Kempen and Hoenkamp’s Incremental Pro­
cedural Grammar (1987), Kempen and 
Vosse’s incremental syntactic tree formation 
(1989), and MacWhinney and Bates’ compe­
tition model (1989). See Levelt (1989, 235 ff) 
for a review.
The output o f  grammatical encoding is a 
surface structure, that is, a hierarchical phrase 
or tree structure with lemmas as terminal 
nodes. Each phrase corresponds to some 
predicate, argument or modifier in the mes­
sage. And each lemma’s syntactic environ­
ment is an appropriate realization o f the lem­
mas syntax (its syntactic category and its ar- 
gument-to-function mapping). Finally, lem­
mas may be marked for prosodic focus, de­
pendent on the prominence o f  concepts in the 
message. The (developing) surface structure 
forms the input to the process of phonological 
encoding.
2.3. Phonological Encoding
Phonological encoding is the construction of 
a phonetic or articulatory plan, given the 
surface structure. The first step here is to 
retrieve each lemma’s phonological specifi­
cation, its ‘lexeme’, from the mental lexicon. 
These lexemes are not fully specified phonetic 
templates or motor programs, ready to be 
executed. In connected speech the shape of 
words is heavily dependent on their environ­
ment. For instance, the words want and to 
may become encoded as wanna in an utter­
ance such as Where d ’you wanna gol The 
context-dependent shape of words has to be 
created time and again from abstract pho­
nological specifications. The units d’you  and 
wanna in the example are called ‘phonological 
words’. They consist o f  a head word and one 
or more clitics that are phonological traces of 
full words.
When the retrieval of a lemma’s lexeme is 
momentarily blocked, the speaker is in a ‘tip- 
of-the-tongue’ (TOT) state (cf. Kohn/Wing- 
field/Menn et al. 1987). The speaker may then 
know the word’s initial segment(s) or its ac­
cent structure. Normally, however, access to 
lexeme information is quite fast. But there is 
evidence that even then segmental informa­
tion is retrieved ‘from left to right’ (Meyer 
1990; 1991).
This segmental information is to be in­
serted into metrical frames. The basic metrical
frame corresponds to a phonological word. 
In producing the utterance Dick gave it, two 
phonological word frames are set up, one for 
Dick and one for gave it. The first one is a 
one-syllable frame, the second one is a two- 
syllable frame. As the segments /d/, /I / and 
/k/ become successively available, they fill the 
one-syllable frame. The segments o f  the gave 
and it lexemes, namely /g /, /e l/, /v /, /I /, and 
ft/, are successively inserted in the second 
phonological word frame. The first tw o seg­
ments, /g/ and /e l/,  complete the first syllable; 
/v/, /I / and HI com pose the second syllable. 
The resulting syllabification (/gel — v lt/) thus 
‘straddles’ the lexeme boundary. The output 
of this ‘slot-filling’ phase o f  phonological en­
coding is a string of syllable specifications. 
Crompton (1982) suggested that each syllable 
thus composed is in turn the address o f  a 
stored phonetic or articulatory plan for that 
syllable. As soon as a syllable address is com ­
posed, the corresponding phonetic plan can 
be retrieved. This model has been adopted 
and further developed by Levelt (1989), but 
there are highly respectable alternative views 
on the transition from phonological to pho­
netic representations (cf. Browman/Goldstein  
1990).
Thus, three processes cooperate in pho­
nological encoding. First metrical frames are 
generated, whose basic units are phonological 
words. Very little is known about the mech­
anisms generating such frames (cf. Levelt 
1989, 318 ff  for a review). In the second proc­
ess, segmental information is spelled out and 
is inserted into the frames. This has been the 
subject o f extensive empirical and theoretical 
research. M ost o f  this research is based on 
the analysis of naturally observed and exper­
imentally elicited speech errors. Shattuck- 
Hufnagel (1979) proposed the slot/filler 
model from which all subsequent work is 
derived. Dell (1986) added an activation  
spreading model o f  segmental spell-out, 
which provides a unified account o f  a large 
range o f speech error phenomena. The third 
process is the mapping o f  syllabified and met­
rically specified phonological strings onto 
phonetic or articularly programs.
The articulatory plan’s metrical specifica­
tion is part o f a larger p r o s o d ic  specifica­
tion. Phonological words are grouped to­
gether into ‘phonological phrases’. They have 
their boundaries right after lexical lieads-of- 
phrase (in particular after nouns in noun 
phrases, after main verbs in verb phrases and 
after adjectives in adjective phrases), as in
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The detective/ suddenly remembered/ that the 
station! could be enteredj from  the other side/ 
(slashes mark ends o f  phonological phrases). 
In their turn, phonological phrases concate­
nate into ‘intonational phrases’, i. e., phrases 
over which a particular intonation contour is 
realized. Speakers have great freedom in par­
titioning an utterance in intonational phrases. 
The above example can be spoken either as 
a single intonational phrase; or a break could 
be made between remembered and that, so 
that two phrases result. Intonational phrases 
are characterized by their tone, and each lan­
guage has a repertoire o f meaningful tones. 
So, for instance, the ‘high-fall’ as in Peter 
has cohie has a serious declarative intention, 
the ‘low-rise’ as in Peter has come has some­
thing reassuring to it, whereas the ‘high-rise’ 
as in Peter has come m ildly invites confir­
mation. But a speaker’s intonational reper­
toire is not limited to these conventional 
tones. Nothing in speech is so directly ex­
pressive o f emotion as intonation and pros­
ody in general (cf. Scherer 1986). It is as yet 
unknown by what mechanisms the formal- 
representational planning o f  speech is merged 
with its directly expressive use.
2.4. Articulation
There is no reason to suppose that the pace 
at which the phonetic plan is generated is 
always completely synchronous with the pace 
of articulation. In fact, there is good evidence 
for the existence o f an ‘articulatory buffer’ 
which temporarily stores successive bits o f  
phonetic plan (at least the size of phonolog­
ical words) until they are to be executed (Mor­
ton 1969). The time needed to retrieve a unit 
from the buffer depends on the total number 
o f units it contains, each additional unit add­
ing some 10 milliseconds to the retrieval time 
(Sternberg/Monsell/Knoll/Wright 1978). It is, 
therefore, most efficient for the buffer to be 
relatively empty. A  retrieved motor program 
first has to be ‘unpacked’, making the whole 
hierarchy o f motor commands available. The 
more complex a unit, the more time it takes 
to unpack it (Sternberg/Wright/Knoll/Mon- 
sell 1980). Buffered speech is subjectively ex­
perienced as ‘internal speech’. Internal speech 
can to some extent be monitored by the 
speaker (see section 2.5.).
The articulatory program is executed by a 
m otor system consisting o f  three major parts. 
The r e sp ir a to r y  s y s te m  provides the
acoustic energy for speech by controlling the 
steady outflow o f air. The respiratory cycle 
during speech is quite different from the nor­
mal breathing cycle; inhalation takes no more 
than 15 percent o f the total cycle, and the air 
pressure gradient is almost constant during 
the outflow o f  air. The la r y n g e a l s y s t e m ,  
with the vocal folds as their central pan, 
controls voicing and loudness in speech. Dur­
ing voicing the laryngeal system provides a 
periodic string o f  puffs with a wide range of 
high-frequency components. The suprala- 
r y n g e a l sy stem  or v o c a l tract contains 
three cavities in which this frequency spec* 
trum is modulated, the nasal, the oral and the 
pharyngeal cavities. They control the timbre 
o f  vowels and consonants. The vocal tract 
can be constricted in different places (dental, 
palatal, alveolar, velar, uvular, glottal), and 
there are different manners in which the« 
constrictions can be released (plosive, frica­
tive, affricative, lateral, etc.). The combina­
tions of places and manners provide the wide 
variety o f speech sounds that the world’s lan­
guages display.
One of the most striking features of speech 
motor control is its context-dependcncy. The 
same speech sound can be produced in dif­
ferent ways, and speakers almost instantly 
adapt to changing physical contingencies in 
the vocal tract. Speech produced by a speaker 
with a pipe in his mouth hardly differs from 
unhampered speech. It is, therefore, unlikely 
that phonetic programs are detailed descrip­
tion o f articularly gestures. Rather, they are 
‘tasks’ for the articulators to perform; they 
prescribe the speech sounds to be generated. 
Recent theories o f articulation suppose the 
existence o f ‘model-referenced’ control (Arbib 
1981). There is an internal model which re­
lates an equivalence class of articulatory ges^  
tures to a particular target sound. Through 
proprioceptive feedback the model is also in­
formed about the contingencies in force. It 
then automatically chooses the least energy 
consuming way to produce the sound struc­
ture dictated by the ‘task’. The set of muscles 
that cooperate as a unit in the context-de­
pendent execution o f  a particular phonetic 
task is called a ‘synergism’ (Lenneberg 1%7) 
or a ‘coordinative structure’ (Saltzman/Kelso 
1987).
2.5. Self-monitoring and Repair
Speakers are their own hearers, They can 
monitor anything in their own speech that 
they can monitor in the speech o f others. They
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can attend to both the meaning and the form 
of their utterances. And when they detect 
trouble, they may interrupt themselves and 
make a repair, such as in Left to pink — er 
straight to pink (speaker tries to describe a 
pattern o f  colored dots) where a lexical error 
is repaired or in What are this kid  — is this 
kid going to say incorrectly? where syntactic 
agreement is reestablished.
How is this self-monitoring performed? 
There are three loci o f self-control in 
Figure 1,1, First, the speaker can attend to 
his own message planning. He may revise a 
planned message before it gets formulated. 
This probably happened in Tell me, er what 
— d'you need a hot sauce? Whatever the 
speaker intended to say here was revised be­
fore it was fully delivered. Hesitations in 
speech are often due to such preformulating 
revisions. Second, the speaker can attend to 
his internal speech. Speech in the articulatory 
buffer is accessible to attention in just the 
same way as overt speech. It can be parsed 
by the speaker’s own language comprehen­
sion system. The speaker may then become 
aware o f  trouble (i. e., at the conceptual level) 
and decide to interrupt himself. This is the 
‘internal monitoring loop’. As long as the 
buffered internal speech has not been articu­
lated, such an interruption can prevent the 
production of an error. This probably hap­
pened in A  v- ... a horizontal line, where the 
speaker was on the verge of uttering vertical 
instead o f horizontal. Third, the speaker can 
attend to his own overt speech, using his 
normal speech understanding system. This is 
the ‘external monitoring loop’. The internal 
loop is faster than the external loop (cf. Lack- 
ner/Tuller 1979; Levelt 1989, 467 ff), but re­
search on close shadowing (Marslen-Wilson
1985) shows that the external loop can, in 
exceptional cases, work in as few as 250 mil­
liseconds, i. e., a syllable’s duration.
There is good evidence that speakers inter­
rupt their speech as soon as serious trouble 
is detected (Levelt 1983). But detection can 
be late because the speaker attends mainly to 
the planning of speech, not to his output. 
This means that one or more words can fol­
low the trouble item before the speaker de­
tects it. This happened in the utterance And 
from green left to pink — er from blue left to 
pink. Here green was wrong, but the speaker 
delivered three more words before interrupt­
ing his speech. The place of interruption is 
unprincipled; it can violate any clause, phrase, 
word, or syllable boundary. There is a ten­
dency, however, to complete a word that is 
not itself the trouble item (Levelt 1983).
After interruption, the speaker often utters 
som e ‘editing expression’. When the occasion 
for repair is a real error, the dom inant editing 
term is er, especially when the interruption is 
immediate. But it can also indicate a more 
explicit rejection o f  what was said, such as no 
or sorry. The use o f  editing terms is different 
when the repair is for appropriateness, not 
for error. In To the right — further to the 
right is yellow  the repair involves a further 
specification, not a rejection o f  what was said. 
In such cases editing terms are used infre­
quently and they are of a different type, not 
indicating rejection, such as I  mean.
Though there is no linguistic systematicity 
in where a speaker interrupts his speech, re­
suming speech is, in fact, systematic. It is 
governed by a linguistic well-formedness rule 
(Levelt 1983; 1989, 486) which says that re­
pairing follows the rules o f  coordination. A 
repair like Is the doctor seeing — er — the 
doctor interviewing patients? is linguistically 
ill-formed, and so is the corresponding co­
ordination Is the doctor seeing patients or the 
doctor interviewing patients?  The repair is the 
nurse — er — the doctor interviewing patients?, 
however, is well-formed and so is the corre­
sponding coordination Is the nurse or the doc­
tor interviewing patients?  Linguistically ill- 
formed repairs are probably as infrequent in 
spontaneous speech as are other linguistic 
deviances, but they can be experimentally elic­
ited (van Wijk/Kempen 1987). The linguistic 
systematicity o f repairing shows that the 
speaker keeps the interrupted formulation in 
abeyance during the planning o f repair. The 
repair proper is then grafted on this still avail­
able grammatical structure.
Repairs are also often elicited by the inter­
locutor. She can m ake the speaker aware o f  
some error or unclarity by saying what?, by 
raising her eyebrows, or by other signals to 
the speaker. In normal conversation, speakers 
capitalize on this cooperative feedback. They 
do not have to be too precise in planning 
their speech, since the interlocutor will react 
when necessary.
3. S peech  U n d erstan d in g
In normal conversation the listener’s objective 
is to discover the speaker’s communicative 
intentions. Several speech understanding 
mechanisms cooperate to accomplish this. 
There are, first, the mechanisms that perform
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an acoustic-phonetic analysis o f  the speech 
signal; they produce a phonetic representation 
of the signal. It is the code for accessing the 
lexicon and for deriving the metrical structure 
of the utterance. The recognized words and 
the prosodic information are then used to 
perform syntactic and semantic parsing o f the 
utterance. And finally, the listener will inter­
pret this linguistic structure in terms o f the 
ongoing discourse in order to derive the 
speaker’s communicative intentions.
We will consider these processes by follow ­
ing the right side o f  Figure 1.1 from bottom  
to top.
3.1. Acbustic-Phonetic Analysis 
Most theories o f  speech perception assume 
the existence of a ‘front end’ processor that 
receives the acoustic signal as input and that 
delivers some kind o f  featural representation 
as output. Opinions differ about the character 
of these features. Liberman/M attingly (1986) 
suggest that they are representations o f the 
speaker’s intended articulatory gestures. This 
would bring the output o f  acoustic-phonetic 
analysis quite close to what we called above 
the speaker’s articulatory plan. Others stay 
closer to the spectral properties o f  the speech 
signal, and suggest the existence o f  detectors 
for onsets and spectral peaks, and for fre­
quencies and m otions o f formants. These, in 
turn, are used to derive the presence, absence, 
or degree o f  phonetic features such as voicing, 
nasality, coronality, vowel height, stridency, 
sonorance, etc., as well as their temporal dis­
tribution (see especially Stevens 1986). These 
patterns o f features are the access codes to 
words in the lexicon (Lahiri/Jongman 1990). 
They are called ‘phonetic representations’ in 
Figure 1.1.
There is still much controversy about the 
character o f  the phonetic representations and 
the way they are derived from the speech 
signal; see the two excellent reviews o f acous­
tic-phonetic processing by Pisoni/Luce (1987) 
and Klatt (1989), A  major problem to be dealt 
with is the huge variability in the speech sig­
nal. A  word’s acoustic shape depends on its 
linguistic context (e. g., the phonological word 
and phrase in which it partakes, its stress and 
its intonation), the rate o f  speech, the dialect 
and sex o f  the speaker, the reverberation and 
noise in the room, and so on. Still, there is 
an increasing conviction that there are rela­
tional patterns in the speech signal that are 
robust and from which the presence o f pho­
netic features can be reliably derived (cf. Ste­
vens/Blumstein 1981; Stevens 1986; Zue 
1986).
Whatever the precise nature of the phonetic 
representation, it must be such that the lis­
tener’s linguistic parsing can be based on it. 
The parser contains two major processing 
components. One deals with phonological de­
coding and lexical access, the other one with 
grammatical (both syntactic and semantic) 
decoding.
3.2. Phonological Decoding  
and Lexical Selection
The phonetic representation of an utterun« 
forms the access code to the lexicon. When 
the listener is exposed to connected spccch, a 
first major problem is how to segment it. To 
recognize a word, one must know where ii 
begins. But connected speech does not hate 
the nice spaces between words that we en­
counter in written language. And there is no 
reason to suppose that phonetic representa­
tions, i. e., temporal distributions of phonetic 
features, make this task any easier. There are 
two ways in which the listener can approach 
the segmentation problem. The first one in to 
use cues in the signal itself. Cutler/Ladd
(1983) reviewed studies showing that English 
listeners prefer to perceive word boundaries 
before strong syllables (i.e ., syllables that 
carry word accent). There is, for instance. 
Taft’s (1984) finding that listeners dominantly 
perceive such speech strings as [lettuce] as a 
single word, lettuce, not as two words kt « . 
whereas words such as [invests] are preferably 
heard as two words, in vests, not invests. Cut­
ler (1989) computed that this segmentation 
strategy will be about 85% correct for English 
open class or content words. Other cues could 
be o f  a phonotactic nature. Frazier (l%?a) 
argued that certain strings can only be word- 
final, such as [-arpt] in English. That would 
tell the listener that what is about to follow 
must be a new word. A second approach is 
to recognize a word before it ends. The lis­
tener can then predict the end of the word, 
and hence the beginning o f the next one. This 
would be a powerful strategy given the cohort 
theory, to which we will presently turn. Still, 
the perennial problems in automatic spetih 
segmentation show that a satisfactory theorv 
of segmentation is still long in coming.
But assuming that the listener knows where 
in the phonetic representation a new word is 
about to begin, how is that word identified? 
Dominant here is Marslen-Wilson’s 'cohort 
theory’ (for recent publications, see Marslen-
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Wilson 1987; 1989). For each lexical item the 
recognition lexicon contains an abstract pho­
nological code (probably not unlike the pho­
nological code in the production lexicon. N o ­
tice that Figure 1.1 does not distinguish be­
tween a perception and a production lexicon; 
opinions differ as to whether such a distinc­
tion has to be made). This phonological code 
specifies a word’s non-redundant distinctive 
features. For English, a phonetic feature like 
[ + aspiration], as after [p] in pot, will not 
appear in the lexicon because it is not dis­
tinctive (there are no two different words p'ot 
and pot). Similarly, for a nasal consonant the 
feature [ + voice] will not be specified, because 
it is redundant: all nasals are voiced (but not 
inversely). Finally, a feature is only specified 
in the word’s representation if  it is marked. 
Thus, nasality is marked and needs specifi­
cation. But non-nasality is the default case; it 
needs no specification in the lexicon. See La- 
hiri/Marslen-Wilson (1991) for further details 
of this representational theory.
After a small stretch o f sensory input (cor­
responding to about two segments o f the in­
put word) has been received, its phonetic fea­
ture pattern activates all lexical items whose 
word-initial phonological specification 
matches the input. So, if  the input word is 
trespass, and the phonetic features o f [tr] have 
become available, not only the lexical item 
trespass will be activated, but also items such 
as tree, tremble, trestle, trombone, etc. This 
set of initially activated items is called the 
‘word-initial cohort’.
As the incoming speech signal proceeds, 
the word-initial cohort is successively re­
duced. As soon as a feature appears that 
contradicts the specification o f /o / in trom­
bone or /i/ in tree, trombone and tree disap­
pear from the cohort. Next, the fricative fea­
ture of Is/ will exclude a candidate like trem­
ble. The reduction of the cohort proceeds 
until a single candidate is left. In the example 
case this happens when the initial stretch 
tresp- has been received. The item trespass is 
the only one in the recognition lexicon whose 
phonological specification matches the pho­
netic pattern of that initial stretch.
The time course o f word recognition is 
jointly determined by the developing infor­
mation in the speech signal, and by the en­
semble o f  competitors to the target word. The 
ensemble of competitor items determines a 
word’s ‘uniqueness point’, the point at which 
it becomes different from all competitors in 
the lexicon. For trespass the uniqueness point
is at /p/. The empirical issue is whether listen­
ers in fact recognize a word when its unique­
ness point is reached, i. e., does the recogni­
tion point coincide with the uniqueness point? 
The experimental evidence is surprisingly as­
suring here (cf. Marslen-Wilson 1987), 
though certain factors such as semantic/syn­
tactic context (Zwitserlood 1989) or word fre­
quency can additionally affect the position of  
the recognition point. Contrary to predictions 
of alternative theories, such as the connec- 
tionist model TRACE by Elman/McClelland
(1984), there is no evidence that activated 
competitors actively inhibit one another 
(Frauenfelder/Segui/Dijkstra 1990).
Though accessing the lexicon is the main 
target of phonological decoding, another ma­
jor task is prosodic decoding. In particular, 
the listener will have to recognize the metrical 
groupings o f  the words recognized. This will 
facilitate subsequent syntactic processing. For 
instance, the last element in a phonological 
phrase is usually the head o f a syntactic 
phrase. A lso, the listener will have to recog­
nize the tone o f an intonational phrase be­
cause this carries important communicative 
information. Little is known about these as­
pects of prosodic recognition, but see the vol­
ume edited by Cutler/Ladd (1983).
The final output o f  phonological decoding/ 
lexical selection is what has been called a 
‘lexical/prosodic representation’ in Figure 1.1, 
It forms the input to the higher-order inter­
pretative processes.
3.3. Grammatical Decoding  
As lexical items and metrical structure be­
come successively available, the listener will 
immediately try to interpret these materials. 
The incrementality o f this process (see 
section 4) implies that syntactic and semantic 
processing proceed ‘on-line’ with the incom­
ing information. There is solid experimental 
evidence that this in fact the case in speech 
understanding (Marslen-W ilson/Tyler 1980; 
Tyler/Warren 1987).
Though syntactic analysis and semantic in­
terpretation develop hand in hand, each fol­
lows its own principles. And there is a certain 
degree o f autonom y in syntactic processing; 
it proceeds even in the face o f  semantic im- 
plausibility or anomaly. Let us first consider 
some aspects o f  syntactic processing.
The time pressure under which a listener 
must perform her syntactic analysis o f the 
incoming materials, makes her follow  a prin­
ciple o f  syntactic analysis that Frazier
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(1987 b) called ‘minim al attachm ent’. It 
means that new materials are syntactically 
attached in such a way that a minimum num ­
ber of nodes is to be added to the existing 
syntactic structure. For exam ple, when the 
listener has heard The spy saw the cop and 
now takes in with binoculars, then she will 
preferably attach the latter prepositional 
phrase to the already existing verb phrase 
node. This would lead to the interpretation 
that seeing the cop (by the spy) was done with  
binoculars. The non-preferred alternative, 
however, is that the noun phrase the cop is 
deleted from the verb phrase node, a new  
additional noun phrase node is created for 
the cop with binoculars, which then in turn 
gets attached to the verb phrase node. This 
would imply the interpretation that the cop 
was equipped with binoculars. The minimal 
attachment principle predicts that listeners 
will tend to ‘garden path’ on sentences where 
minimal attachment leads to the wrong so ­
lution. According to this assumption, a sen­
tence like The horse raced passed  the bam  fe ll  
in a puddle must be harder to understand than 
The horse raced past the bam  and fe ll in a 
puddle, and in fact it is (Ferreira/Clifton
1986), Regrettably, the minimal attachment 
principle has alm ost exclusively been studied 
in  reading tasks. Whether it is equally valid 
for spoken language com prehension, where 
prosody provides important cues, is an open  
issue.
That speech is syntactically processed even 
i f  it is semantically anom alous was dem on­
strated by Marslen-W ilson/Tyler (1980). In a 
more recent experiment, Tyler/Warren (1987) 
confirmed and extended this finding. They 
used a word m onitoring task, in  which the 
listener had to push a button as soon as she 
heard a given target word. For example, the 
listener is given K IT C H EN  as target word, 
and is presented with the follow ing normally 
spoken sentence: The m aid /  was carefully 
peeling /  the po tatoes  /  in the garden  / because 
during the summer /  a hot K IT C H E N  /  is 
unbearable to work in (here the slashes mark 
phonological phrase boundaries). For such 
sentences listeners push the button about 300 
milliseconds after onset o f  the target word. 
When a semantically anom alous text was pre­
sented (such as An orange dream  /  was loudly 
watching j the house / during sm elly nights / 
because within these signs /  a slow  K ITC H E N  
/  snored / with crashing leaves) reaction times 
were, not surprisingly, slower (by some 60 
milliseconds), If, however, the local syntax
around K ITC H E N  was also disrupted (by 
replacing a slow KITC H EN  by slow vgn 
K ITC H E N ), latencies increased (by utioiheV 
45 milliseconds). Thus, local syntactic parsing 
apparently proceeds where it can, even when 
the speech is semantically anomalous.
However, this is not the case for global 
syntactic parsing. When the phonological 
phrases in the anomalous sentence arc scram­
bled (as in Because within these signs / during 
smelly lights / was loudly watching / the k m  
/  an orange dream /  a slow KITCH EN  / m rtJ  
I with crashing leaves) so that global (but ttei 
local) syntax is disrupted, the reaction liroei 
are the same as for the original semantically 
anomalous text. Tyler and Warren could sho* 
that global syntax is only effective when the 
text is meaningful. And this should nol be 
surprising. The eventual output o f  global*}«* 
tactic parsing is a conceptual structure whose 
thematic roles (see section 2,2, above) corre­
spond to the function-argument mapping^' 
the retrieved lexical items. If these mapping 
are violated, as in semantically anomalous 
text, global parsing will be blocked.
The following picture emerges: First, as 
words are successively recognized, their syn­
tactic and semantic information beat®« 
available to the parser. The syntactic infor­
mation is concerned with a word’s 
(Noun, Verb, etc.) and its argument-lo-func- 
tion mapping (see section 2.2. above). Of 
these, the category information is proKih;» 
enough to initiate a second process, local syn­
tactic analysis (Frazier 1989), We have n<? 
difficulty in parsing nonsense such as The bar 
slept the guitar. Here we construct a vjib 
phrase, slept the guitar, with the guitar in­
direct object o f slept, in spite of the fact itui 
this contradicts the argument-to-lunilirci 
mapping o f sleep (an intransitive verb wkh 
does not take a direct object). The imlul 
syntactic parsing can also ignore scmaniw 
(the meaning of sleep dictates that the verb 
requires an animate subject, but Iwer h in­
animate). However, initial local parsing is 
very dependent on the intactness of phono­
logical phrases. Tyler/Warren (1987) founds 
dramatic increase o f  reaction times when &  
phonological phrase was broken up {e.g..ik  
slow KITCH EN  being distributed over 
phrases, with a break after the slow), hi shwi. 
initial local syntactic analysis uses the medi­
cal output o f  the acoustic-phonetic comp 
nent plus the syntactic category information 
o f the recognized words. But a third pro«**, 
global syntactic parsing is, at least in
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based on semantic analysis. Grammatical 
functions such as ‘subject’, ‘direct object’, or 
‘indirect object’ are translated into the the­
matic roles they are attached to in the lexical 
representations. For instance, the indirect ob­
ject o f the verb give in a sentence will be 
interpreted as the recipient o f the action o f  
transfer denoted by give. This is syntactically 
based semantic interpretation. The final out­
put of global parsing, then, is a conceptual 
structure, akin to the speaker’s ‘message’ (see 
section 2.1.). It is therefore referred to as a 
‘derived message’ in Figure 1.1.
Only one aspect of global parsing has been 
studied in some detail for spoken language: 
the resolution of anaphora. Syntax can re­
strict the interpretation o f an anaphor. In the 
sentence (i) The boxer told the skier that the 
doctor o f  the team would blame himself for the 
recent injury, the reflexive pronoun himself 
can only refer back to the doctor, not to the 
boxer or the skier. Will the listener reactivate 
the doctor at encountering the anaphor, in 
correspondence with syntax, or will the other 
referents also be reactivated, ignoring syntax? 
Nicol (1988) studied this question in a so- 
called cross-modal priming experiment. The 
subject listened to a sentence of this kind. 
Right after the pronoun, either a word (like 
nurse) or a non-word (like murve) was pre­
sented visually. The subject’s task was to de­
cide whether the visual probe was a word or 
a non-word, and to indicate this by pushing 
either a yes- or a no-button, accordingly. The 
latency o f  this lexical decision was measured. 
If the pronoun reactivates the syntactically 
indicated antecedent (e.g., the doctor), this 
may lead to a more rapid response to an 
associate probe (e.g., nurse) as compared to 
a neutral probe (e.g., house), and in fact it 
did. In contrast, no facilitation was obtained 
for associates of the other potential antece­
dents (e. g., the boxer or the skier).
What happens when there is no syntactic 
restriction on the interpretation of a pro­
noun? Consider sentence (ii), The boxer told 
the skier that the doctor fo r  the team would 
blame him for the recent injury. Here the pro­
noun him can refer back to the boxer or the 
skier (but not to the doctor). And Nicol now  
found reactivation of both the boxer and the 
skier (but not of the doctor), in complete 
agreement with the syntax.
Even null-anaphors produce essentially the 
same effect. In The policeman saw the boy that 
the crowd at the party accused t o f  the crime, 
t stands for a null-anaphor (or trace) that
refers back to the boy. And indeed, by probing 
at this position Swinney/Ford/Frauenfelder/ 
Bresnan (unpublished) showed that the boy 
was reactivated there, but not the crowd. For 
an excellent review o f this and related work, 
see Nicol/Swinney (1989). N otice also that in 
examples like these the listener is making es­
sential use o f  the verb’s function-argument 
structure. The verb accuse requires a direct 
object, so the listener knows that there must 
be a direct object trace after accuse. Global 
syntactic processing takes the verb-argument 
structure into account (i.e ., different from 
local syntactic processing).
Though apparently automatically re­
stricted by syntax, the listener’s binding of 
anaphors is a semantic activity. Cloitre/Bever 
(1988), for instance, found that when the syn­
tactic antecedent is a concrete noun it is easier 
reactivated by a pronoun than when it is an 
abstract noun.
Though the derived message is a concep­
tual interpretation o f  the utterance, it is one 
at a rather shallow level. As a rule, it will not 
be the ultimate interpretation. In example (ii) 
above, for instance, the derived message does 
not specify whether the anaphor refers back 
to the boxer, the skier, or som ebody else men­
tioned earlier in the discourse. Solving such 
problems o f  interpretation, as well as many 
others, are part o f  ‘discourse processing’, to 
be discussed after a final remark on the out­
put o f  the parser.
Though derived messages form the parser’s 
main output, they are not the only informa­
tion it makes available to the conceptualizes 
The parser can also transmit certain inter­
mediary results. The listener can, for instance, 
attend to phonetic or syntactic properties of  
the utterance. She can, for instance, notice 
the speaker’s dialect, or grammatical errors. 
The term ‘parsed speech’ in Figure 1.1 in­
cludes these aspects, as well as the main out­
put o f  parsing, the derived message.
3.4. Discourse Processing 
The last step towards deriving the speaker’s 
communicative intention is called discourse 
processing. It is the subject o f extensive re­
search; here we can touch on a few aspects 
only. The first one is ‘identifying referents’ 
and refers to the listener’s attempt to deter­
mine what entities the speaker is talking 
about. Clark/Schreuder/Buttrick (1983) 
showed subjects a photograph depicting pres­
ident Reagan and David Stockman (a high, 
but not well-known official). When they
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asked You know who this man is, don’t you?, 
m ost subjects answered that it was Reagan. 
But when asked D o you have any idea at all 
who this man is?, nobody said Reagan; they  
all made guesses about the other person on  
the photograph. The referent chosen for this 
man depends on the listener’s presupposition 
about the speaker’s knowledge, namely that 
Reagan is better known than the other de­
picted person.
An important mechanism in the interpre­
tation o f discourse, and in particular in the 
assignment o f  reference, is the construction  
of a ‘discourse model’. It is a mental m odel 
(Johnson-Laird 1983) about the state o f  a f­
fairs discussed. Typically, when the listener 
encounters an indefinite description (as in  
There is a baby here), she will set up a new  
address in the model (in this case an address 
for the baby entity). However, when she en­
counters a definite description (as in The baby  
is crying, or It is crying), she will infer that 
the address is already present, and the pred­
ication is interpreted as being about the entity  
at that address (cf. Seuren 1993 for a theory 
o f reference assignment in discourse m odels).
Earlier we saw that anaphoric reference 
can still be undecided in the derived message 
(as was the case for him in example (ii) above). 
The listener can then choose the m ost salient 
entity in the discourse model as a referent for 
the pronoun (Clark/Schreuder/Buttrick 1983; 
Morrow 1986). Alternatively, the listener m ay  
select the entity mentioned last (the skier in 
example (ii)). This is also dependent on the 
‘genre’ o f the discourse, as Morrow estab­
lished.
Inferring referents is devilishly com pli­
cated, How does a listener (waitress in a res­
taurant) compute the person referent for her 
colleague’s remark The hamburger wants the 
bill (Nunberg 1979)? It must be the person  
who was served a hamburger. Nunberg ar­
gued that there is some ‘referring function’ 
that maps the demonstratum (the hamburger) 
onto the intended referent (see also Faucon- 
nier 1985), But how does the listener com pute 
such arbitrary referring functions?
Such cases of indirect reference are by no  
means the only instances o f non-literal inter­
pretation in speech understanding. Other par­
amount cases are the interpretation o f  indirect 
requests (see section 2.1.), the interpretation  
o f metaphor (Sperber/Wilson 1986), irony  
(Clark/Gerrig 1984), hyperbole (Grice 1975) 
and other figures o f  speech. In these latter 
cases prosody, and especially the tones o f
intonational phrases, may cue the listener to 
infer the speaker’s intention.
Finally, the ‘denotation o f  words’ surpasses 
the shallow semantic interpretation of the de­
rived message. Hôrmann (1983) showed that 
quantifiers such as some or many are inter­
preted in relationship to what they quantify. 
For example, there are less people in some 
people than grains o f sand in some grains of 
sand. Morrow and Clark (1988) extended this 
study by showing that the distance denoted 
by the verb approach depends on what is 
approaching and what is being approached. 
A tractor approaching a farmhouse, for in­
stance, is at a greater distance than a mouse 
approaching a farmhouse. The distance is 
even smaller, when a m ouse approaches a 
piece o f cheese. In all these cases the listener’s 
discourse model, or image o f  the situation is 
decisive for the inference.
Discourse processing requires the listener’s 
full attention. The derived message, which 
comes rather automatically with the incoming 
speech, is only a cue to the interlocutor’s 
intentions. There is no limit to the variety of 
discourse situations, and every utterance is !<> 
be interpreted in the light o f  the current sit­
uation, the knowledge the interlocutors share, 
the social relation they are engaged in, the 
lay-out of their physical environment, and so 
on. Recovering the speaker’s intentions, not 
speech perception or parsing, is the listener's 
ultimate goal.
4. Increm entality, A uton om y  
and Interaction
It is not the intention of Figure 1.1 to suggest 
that processing components work one after 
another. On the contrary, parallel processing 
does take place both in speaking and in lis­
tening. However, it occurs in a specific way 
that Kempen and Hoenkamp (1982) called 
‘incremental’. Though all components work 
in parallel, they work on different bits and 
pieces. Concretely, as soon as the speaker has 
conceived o f an initial concept to be ex­
pressed, it is delivered to the Formulitlor, 
Instead of waiting until the whole message 
has been planned, the first concept is gram­
matically encoded — a word is retrieved from 
the lexicon and receives case, That bit of 
surface structure is then subjected to phono­
logical encoding, and so on. Meanwhile o th e r  
fragments follow the same route. As a con­
sequence, a speaker can begin articulating 3
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sentence long before he has completed the 
planning of his message. It is a ‘roofing tile’ 
organization of processing. Similarly in 
speech perception, as soon as the initial frag­
ment o f the speech signal has been received, 
acoustic-phonetic processing o f that bit o f  
signal begins. And as soon as its first two or 
three segments have been phonetically ana­
lyzed a word-initial cohort is activated. Syn­
tactic local parsing can start as soon as the 
first word is recognized, and so can semantic 
processing and discourse interpretation. Each 
processor works incrementally on successive 
fragments it receives from the previous one. 
Thus, there is both staging and parallelness 
of computation.
Parallel computation is only possible be­
cause most components are fully automatic. 
If the language user were to pay attention to 
all component processes, parallel processing 
would be infeasible. Language users can nor­
mally limit their attention to conceptual proc­
essing: planning messages, selfmonitoring, 
and discourse interpretation. The fluency o f  
speech production and the ‘on-line’ character 
of speech comprehension are essentially based 
on a combination of automaticity and incre­
mental production.
The staging inherent in the notion of in­
cremental processing is ultimately an empiri­
cal issue. And indeed, it has been, and still is 
a topic o f much debate (cf. Garfield 1987). In 
the ideal case o f staging, a later processing 
component down the line cannot affect the 
mode of processing of an earlier component. 
There is only feedforward o f information, no 
interaction between components.
Research in speech production has pro­
duced evidence of feedback from phonologi­
cal to grammatical encoding (Dell 1986; Bock
1987), but this feedback is highly limited (Lev- 
elt 1989, 275 ff.; Levelt/Schriefers/Vorberg et 
al. 1991). There is at present no hard evidence 
for any other direct feedback interaction be­
tween speech production components.
The picture for speech understanding is less 
straightforward. Though there is good evi­
dence that a word’s acoustic-phonetic proc­
essing is not affected by lexical or higher level 
processes (Frauenfelder/Segui/Dijkstra 1990), 
the effects of context on word recognition 
have been heavily debated. It is rather safe 
now to say that when a speaker hears an 
ambiguous word (like bank), both o f  its 
meanings are temporarily retrieved from the 
lexicon, even if one is ruled out by the con­
text (as in I withdrew my money from  the
bank) (Seidenberg/Tanenhaus/Leiman/Bien- 
kowski 1982). The inappropriate reading is 
then quickly lost (at least within 200 millisec­
onds, cf. Jones 1989). In other words, there 
is no feedback from semantic parsing to lex­
ical access here. The story is more com pli­
cated for context effects on the recognition 
of non-ambiguous words. U sing the cross- 
modal priming technique, Zwitserlood (1989) 
showed that (i) the structure o f  the word- 
initial cohort is independent o f  biasing se­
mantic or syntactic context, but also that (ii) 
context begins to have an effect on lexical 
selection just before the stimulus information 
has reached the word’s uniqueness point (cf., 
section 3.2. above). This finding contradicts 
Marslen-Wilson’s (1989) claim that not only 
lexical activation but also lexical selection is 
exclusively stimulus driven.
As far as grammatical decoding is con­
cerned, it probably involves a relatively au­
tonomous syntactic subcomponent. Whereas 
the initial, local syntactic analysis proceeds 
independent o f semantic context, global syn­
tactic parsing seems to interact with both 
semantic and discourse interpretation.
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